b. Solution of the Doubts

73. [As to the first doubt] - As to the first doubt, I show that a whole is a being different from all of the parts jointly and separately.

First, because otherwise the difference between ‘whole’ and ‘one’ in Metaphysics 8.6.1045a7-33 would not be true, for it is said there that a single whole that is per se one is other than a single whole that is one by aggregation (as a pile or a heap), and this latter whole is merely its parts. The inferred consequent seems unacceptable, first from Metaphysics ibid. [where it is said that a heap has no cause of its being one but a whole does], and second because also a whole that is per accidens one is more one than a whole by aggregation and less one than a whole that is per se one - and yet a whole that is per accidens one is not merely its parts, for, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.12.1037b14-18 ‘On the Unity of Definition’, a white man is a ‘one something’ by the fact that whiteness is in the man; he would not therefore be such a single whole if whiteness did not inform him.

74. Further, the per se ‘term to which’ of generation is something that has its proper entity, because generation proceeds to the being of its proper term; but the whole, not one or other part of it, is the ‘term to which’ of generation; indeed, if each part were to pre-exist and then first be united, the generation or production would no less be of the very composite - just as, in the case of resurrection, given that both the soul and the body as to their entity pre-existed, resuscitation would still be of the whole composite; but resuscitation would not be to the being of the body or of the soul, nor to both beings; therefore to some third thing different from them.

75. Third, one can argue similarly about corruption, following the argument of the Philosopher at the end of Metaphysics 7 (17.1041b11-17), because a and b remain and not ab, and the same thing cannot really remain and not really remain, so ab is something other really than a and b; therefore, since so it is in the case of all per se composites, namely that it is not repugnant to the idea of parts that they should remain and the whole not, therefore there will be some entity proper to the whole itself that is different from the entity of the parts.

76. Again fourth, because otherwise [sc. if what is asserted in the first paragraph of n.73 is not true] nothing would be per se caused by the intrinsic causes, namely by matter and form; for because these causes cause this composite, it is plain that these causes are parts of the thing caused; but these causes are not parts of the other part nor of both parts, because neither one nor both of them are caused, for they are themselves the first causes and the first principles of the thing;     therefore etc     .

77. Again, it would follow, fifth, that there was no being where the proper feature and operation or any proper accident would per se exist, because these exist in the species and not in the matter or form of the species, nor in both matter and form together save as matter and form are a unity in some per se whole.

78. [To the second doubt] - About the second doubt [n.72], I say that a whole is also a different being and with a different absolute entity, because a mere respect would not suffice for calling some whole being a per se one, for in the case of a single whole that is per accidens one there is a per se respect - and an essential respect - between part and part, as is plain of the dependence of an accident on a subject; likewise, the quiddities of all absolutes, as including matter and form and as being definable (for they are definable species as such) are not just relative entities formally, which, however, they would have to be if the proper entity of a whole were a respect.

79. This conclusion also follows from the reasons given for the first doubt [nn.73-77], for no generation is per se toward a respect as to the term to which [n.74]; nor either is corruption from a mere respect as from the term from which [n.75]; nor are absolute causes causes of something merely relational [n.76]; nor does a proper feature follow a whole precisely insofar as the whole is relational, nor either does a proper operation so follow nor any absolute accident [n.77]; nor finally does being able to assign a specific difference for all quiddities seem possible, because positing a difference merely of respects between united parts does not seem possible [n.73]. Also, as to the issue at hand, it does not seem possible for a respect to be the proper idea of founding a relation of union with the Word - which, however, should be possible when positing that the whole is assumed in the way before stated [nn.65-71], if the entity of the whole, as distinct from the parts, not be posited as being absolute.

80. [To the third doubt] - As to the third doubt I say that if in a whole there is understood to be, aside from the form of the part (of which sort in man is the intellective soul), another form supervening on it as it were that is also something of the whole itself and yet is called the form of the whole by distinguishing this form from the form of the part (because it more completely constitutes the whole than the other form does), then this understanding is false; for in that case there would be in man some form constituting man that is more perfect than the intellective soul, which is unacceptable. Likewise, if this third doubt rests on a reason taken from the perfection of the whole, namely that a one would not be made from the matter and form (each of which is a part) save through some form uniting these parts, which form would be the form of the whole, then this reason would entail a process to infinity; for I ask, as to this form, how it makes a one along with the matter and form of a part. If it does so of itself, then the same could be granted about the form of a part, that it is of itself of a nature to make a one along with the matter; if it does so through something else, there will be a process to infinity.

81. I say then that over and above the form that perfects the matter and is thereby said to be a form of a part (and understanding this to be the ultimate form, when positing several forms in the same thing), there is no need to posit some form perfecting as it were both the matter and form, because matter and form are in the whole not parts of the same idea or elements that are perfectible by some third act, but one [sc. matter] is the perfectible proper and the other [sc. form] is act; and this reason is why they make a per se one, from Metaphysics 8.6.1045a7-8, 23-25.Aristotle: “As to the doubt what the cause is of being a one..., if this is matter but that form, and this indeed is in potency but that in act, the question asked will seem no longer in doubt.” Scotus’ commentary ad loc., sect.1 ch.6 n.37: “One must note that the strength of this solution stands in this fact.that man.is per se one insofar as he is composed of matter and form as of potency and act; nor is any cause to be sought why these make a one other than that the former is as potency while the latter is as act.” ³²

82. If however the form of the whole is understood not to be something constituting the whole but to be the whole nature, as the quiddity, then in this way it can well be conceded that the form of the whole is other than the form of a part and that the nature of quiddity can be called form (the point is plain from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.2.1013a26-27, ‘On Cause’Aristotle, “But in another way cause is said to be the species [form] and exemplar; this then is the idea of the ‘what it was to be’ [the quiddity].” Scotus’ commentary ad loc., sect.1 ch.2 n.17, “For form belongs most of all to the quiddity of a thing. One must note that the form of a thing is called the species, insofar as it is the principle of being and of specification.” ³³); but that there is some form other than the form of a part is plain from the first article here touched on [nn.73-75].

83. But in respect of what is it the form?

I reply by saying that it is the form in respect of the whole composite, not indeed the informing form but the form whereby the composite is a quidditative being; and in this way the whole being formally is the form of the whole (the way a white thing is said to be white by whiteness); not indeed that the form of the whole is as it were the cause of it, causing the whole as it were along with the matter and the partial form, but it is the whole itself precisely considered, in the way that Avicenna speaks of it in his Metaphysics 5 ch.1, “horseness is only horseness.”Avicenna, “Although the universal itself would be man or horse, the intention in this case is different, additional to the intentionality that is humanity or horseness; for the definition of horseness is other than the definition of universality, and universality is not included in the definition of horseness... Horseness, therefore, from the fact that many things come together in its definition, is common but, from the fact it is taken along with indicated properties and accidents, it is singular. Horseness then in itself is just horseness. For humanity itself, from the fact it is humanity, is something additional to any of the things mentioned [sc. the accidents and properties of this man], and in its definition nothing is taken but humanity alone.” ³⁴

84. And if you ask for the causes of this entity, I say that it is a third from its causes and comes from them causally and not from other causes; and as to why such and such causes cause and constitute a third entity, different from themselves, which is a per se one [sc. in the case of substance], and as to why other causes cause a third entity, different from themselves, which is not a per se one [sc. in the case of substance and accident], there is no reason other than that the former entities of causes are such as they are and that the latter are of a different idea. The Philosopher insinuates this in Metaphysics 8 [n.81] where, responding to a question about the unity of the composite, how from matter and form it becomes a per se one, he assigns as cause that ‘this is per se act, that is per se potency’; and just as this is act per se and that potency per se, so this whole is one per se; and just as this is act per accidens and that potency per accidens, so this constituted whole is one per accidens. But as to why this entity is act per se with respect to this thing and another entity is only per accidens with respect to something else has no reason other than that an entity of this sort is ‘this entity’; for, just as between the hot and heating there is no middle in genus of efficient cause, so neither between this form and thus informing [sc. informing a substance as opposed to a substance and accident] is there any middle in genus of formal cause; but just as the hot heats insofar as it is hot and not because of anything else, so the soul thus perfects and thus constitutes insofar as it is soul.

85. It is thus plain, therefore, with respect to this doubt [sc. the third, nn.72, 80], that there is a medium of congruity [nn. 46-47] of the union of human nature with the Word, namely that the medium is the whole nature constituted from the parts, which is a certain absolute third thing, different from each and both of the parts jointly and separately.